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Determinants of Land Finance in China: 
A Study Based on Provincial-level Panel Data 
 
Abstract:  
Tapping land values to raise extra-budgetary funds for local coffers has been a 
prominent fiscal phenomenon in many developing countries. This article, based on a 
provincial-level panel dataset for the period 1999-2009, examines the factors behind 
Chinese local governments’ reliance on land finance. Our analysis shows that 
intergovernmental fiscal arrangements, such as the central-provincial fiscal imbalance, 
and the lack of adequate revenue capacity of sub-provincial governments, have 
encouraged local governments to exploit land leasing. There is also evidence 
suggesting that political factors might have a significant impact on land finance 
arrangements, but these tentative results need further investigation. This research 
contributes to the body of literature on intergovernmental fiscal relations, and 
improves our understanding of the dynamics and complexity of land finance 
arrangements in China. Policy implications are drawn from this analysis for further 
reforms of land management and intergovernmental financing in China and other 
developing countries facing similar challenges.  
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Determinants of Land Finance in China: 
A Study Based on Provincial-level Panel Data 
Introduction 
Countries with multi-level governments often face challenges of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations of a principal-agent nature (Van Houten 2009). The 
central government, as the principal, may delegate responsibility to local agents for 
the management of certain functions to ensure efficient implementation and 
responsiveness to the needs and preferences of the local population. At the same time, 
for fiscal integrity and accountability, the center commonly places either statutory or 
constitutional constraints, such as balanced budget requirements, to limit local agents’ 
spending or indebtedness (Bohn and Inman 1996). The constraints on government 
spending and borrowing weaken local politicians’ capacity to channel benefits to the 
public and particularly to their supporters. In response to these fiscal constraints, 
however, local politicians may seek to devise various means to move government 
activities “off the budget” or “underground” (Bennett 2003). Allen and Radev (2006) 
note that, extra-budgetary funds (EBFs), an umbrella concept that includes all revenue, 
expenditure, and financing that are outside the control of budgetary rules and 
procedures, have been a major component of local government financing particularly 
in developing countries.1 On average, in 2005, the amount of EBFs accounted for 3.1% 
of national GDP in both developed and developing countries (Allen and Radeve 2006, 
p.11).  
Much of the analysis of EBFs to date has focused on their aggregate impact on 
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government finances and the economy, and on measures to deal with the resulting 
problems (Kraan 2004; Potter and Diamond 1999). Scant attention has been devoted 
to examining the determinants of EBFs (Bennett and DiLorenzo 1982; Marlow and 
Joulfaian 1989; Merrifield 1994). In particular, we have little knowledge about this 
issue in developing and transition countries. Uncertainty about the determinants of 
EBFs may lead to misunderstanding of their causes, and inappropriate measures to 
address the problems EBFs often cause. This research aims to fill this important niche 
by examining the determinants of one important category of EBFs in local China, that 
is, land conveyance fees (tudi churangjin), or land leasing revenue. 
One of the most prominent fiscal phenomena in China in recent years has been 
the heavy reliance of local governments on land conveyance fees. This phenomenon 
has been dubbed as “land finance.”2 In 1998, revenues from sales of land leases were 
classified as an identifiable category of extra-budgetary fund that must be included in 
budget reports to the People’s Congress, but the management of the revenue has still 
been loose compared to that of formal budgetary revenue (Wong and Bird 2008).  
Land finance, in many cases, represents a positive opportunity for local 
governments. Not only can land leasing generate substantial amounts of revenue, but 
also the use of surplus land for infrastructure can contribute to urban growth in an 
economically efficient manner (Peterson 2009). However, the heavy dependence on 
land finance among local governments in China has raised great public concerns and 
attracted much attention for a number of reasons. First, given the fact that land is a 
finite asset, the capital value of fees for the rights to lease land is not a source of 
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ongoing stable funds to meet growing expenditure commitments: the land conveyance 
fee is in many respects a windfall of revenue, or a once-only capital gain, for local 
governments (Lin and Ho 2005). The current practice of relying on land finance to 
fund capital project can hardly be stable or sustainable in the long run. Second, such 
land finance effectively takes resources and social wealth from the future for the 
current generation by collecting the one-off land conveyance fee in respect of the 
following 40 to 70 years, resulting in inter-generational inequity. Third, since land 
prices are extremely volatile, revenue dependence on land leasing and reliance on 
land and property values as the collateral for borrowing can result in a threat to 
overall fiscal stability should there be a decline or bubble burst in the real estate 
market (Peterson 2006). Fourth, the rapid pace of land conversion from agricultural to 
non-agricultural use has been threatening China’s food security and could not go on 
for an extended period of time (Lichtenberg and Ding 2008). Last but not least, 
large-scale land leasing has also provided opportunities for corruption and has been at 
the centre of thousands of social unrests across China because of lack of consultation 
and appropriate compensation, posing a challenge to the legitimacy of the Chinese 
government (Guo 1997; Nitikin, Shen, Wang and Zou 2012). In order to better 
understand the dynamics of current land finance arrangements, and to suggest 
solutions to the problems associated with them, we develop a model to examine the 
factors behind Chinese local governments’ heavy dependence on land finance, using a 
provincial-level panel dataset for the period 1999-2009. 
The empirical results of this study suggest that the central-provincial fiscal 
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relations and the fiscal arrangements between provincial governments and 
sub-provincial governments do influence land finance dependency. There is also 
evidence that suggests political factors might have a significant effect, though these 
results need further investigation for confirmation.  
The rest of this paper is organized into five sections. The next section describes 
historical developments and the current practice of land finance. The third section 
reviews related literature, and is followed by a description of the data, model, 
hypotheses, and estimation methods in the fourth section. The results from the 
research and a discussion are presented in the fifth section. The last section sets out 
our conclusions and points out the implications of this research. 
Land Finance in China 
From 1954 to 1978, land in socialist China was allocated entirely to users under 
administrative plans without any charges (Lin and Ho 2005; Yeh and Wu 1996). 
Since the introduction of economic reforms and a more open door policy from the late 
1970s, the Chinese government has initiated a series of reforms to accommodate the 
demands from foreign and overseas Chinese businesses for the clarification of land 
use rights and land property rights (Zhu 2005). In 1986, China’s first Land 
Administration Law was enacted. It legally confirmed a split land ownership system 
in which the state owns all land in urban areas and rural collectives own land in rural 
areas. In 1987, Shenzhen, a city in Guangdong Province at the vanguard of reforms, 
initiated a significant land reform. It separated the rights of ownership from the rights 
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of use of urban state-owned land, keeping the state ownership unchanged, but 
conveying the urban land use right from the state to industrial and commercial 
developers for a period of 40-70 years (Yeh and Wu 1996). This new practice 
generated a huge amount of land leasing revenue, or ‘land conveyance fees’, for the 
Shenzhen government. In 1988, China’s Constitution was amended, allowing the 
separation of land use rights from land ownership and the lease of land use rights in 
an open market (Li 2003). This new regime has provided sub-national governments, 
the de facto representatives of the state in land administration, with an unprecedented 
lucrative opportunity from the emerging land market. For rural land, the property right 
is collectively owned by peasants. According to the Land Administration Law, such 
property can be expropriated by the state “in the public interest”; the former peasant 
owners are entitled to compensation, but this is usually far below the revenue received 
by sub-national governments when they lease the land to commercial users (Yep and 
Fong 2009). Thus, China’s split land ownership system and land use regulations have 
resulted in a substantial price difference between the urban and rural sectors, 
generating an opportunity for governments to access a new fiscal revenue stream. 
The sharing of the land conveyance fees between the central and sub-national 
governments is reflected in changes in intergovernmental fiscal relations. In the late 
1980s, sub-national governments’ share of land conveyance fee was set at 40%, which 
discouraged local governments from getting involved in land development. This share 
was increased to 68% in 1989, and raised again to 95% in 1992 (Peterson 2009). 
When the recentralization-oriented tax-sharing system (fenshuizhi) reform was 
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launched by the central government in 1994, the centre permitted sub-national 
governments to keep the entire land conveyance fee as an extra-budgetary revenue 
base. Even though the Chinese central government classified it as an identifiable 
category of extra-budgetary funds in 1998, as	  a first step toward incorporating it into 
budgetary revenues (Wong and Bird 2008), and attempted to impose more stringent 
measures on its collection and usage in 2007,3 local governments still have 
considerable discretion over how it is raised and administered and substantial 
flexibility in the way it is used, with relative immunity from the watchful eyes of local 
People’s Congress as well as higher levels of government. Local officials often use 
land conveyance fees as a convenient revenue source for infrastructure construction 
and other pro-development activities that help their own careers and political 
ambitions (Cao and Zhao 2011). 
Land conveyance fees have become a significant component of Chinese local 
coffers over the past decade. According to data from China Land and Resource 
Almanac, in 1999, the total amount of land conveyance fees was about CNY 51.4 
billion (USD 642 million), just over 9% of total sub-national budgetary revenue 
(CNY 558 billion). In 2011, land conveyance fees amounted to CNY 3.15 trillion 
(approximately USD 484.6 billion), or just over 60% of total sub-national budgetary 
revenue.  
Literature Review 
The literature often uses three categories of factors - fiscal, political, and 
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socioeconomic - to explain the determinants of public finance phenomena 
(Avellaneda 2009). With regard to the determinants of extra-budgetary funds (EBFs), 
Allen and Radev (2006) provide a theoretical framework for analysis, consisting of 
two main groups of factors: a series of “market” or budgetary system failures and 
political economy factors. Some empirical research (Bennett and Dilorenzo 1982; 
Marlow and Joulfaian 1989) based on state-level data in the U.S. has revealed that a 
state’s revenue structure may exert a significant impact on EBFs, which offer the 
opportunity to substitute for or supplement budgetary revenues. Political factors, such 
as the strength of a governor’s veto power, the length of legislative terms of office and 
number of legislators, may have a negative impact on EBFs (Merrifield 1994). 
The theoretical frameworks and empirical research developed in the context of 
western democracies provide some guidance for us to examine the determinants of 
land finance, an important EBF in China. But China’s unique authoritarian political 
system and its transitional economy may lead to distinctive explanations. We attempt 
to examine the determinants of Chinese local governments’ heavy reliance on land 
finance from two perspectives: 1) intergovernmental fiscal relations, and 2) political 
incentives. The main arguments are briefly presented as follows. 
According to a report released by the World Bank, in the post-Mao era, China 
has been one of the most decentralized countries in the world in terms of the 
expenditure assignments allocated to local governments (Wong and Bird 2008). The 
expenditures assigned to local governments are often huge in comparison to 
international norms. Chinese local governments are overburdened with expenditure 
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assignments with limited budgetary revenues. Furthermore, Wong and Bird (2008) 
argue that “the most critical fiscal issue in China today essentially arises from the 
mismatch of expenditures and revenue between different layers of governments from 
the 1994 tax-sharing system reform and the resulting distortions as China’s various 
layers of government struggled to find their fiscal feet in this fundamentally distorted 
structure” (p.13). Consequently, in response to the centralization of budgetary 
revenue, local governments turned their attention to other means to raise revenue 
outside the budgetary system, such as from their land assets (Peterson 2009; Cao, 
Feng and Tao 2008).  
Political factors are also known to influence fiscal outcomes at the subnational 
level (Alt and Lowry 1994; Bastida, Benito, and Guillamón 2009). Under China’s 
authoritarian personnel management system, the central government holds power 
over the selection and appointment of local officials (Chan 2004). The shift to a 
cadre evaluation and promotion system mainly based on economic performance in 
the reform era has created an incentive for local leaders to promote economic 
development in order for enhancing their prospects for promotion (Chan 2004; Guo 
2009; Li and Zhou 2005). Land finance has become a convenient source of 
extra-budgetary revenue that can be used for infrastructure construction and other 
pro-development activities. Some scholars argue that land finance might be 
correlated with a leader’s length of time in office and age (Liu, Wu and Ma 2012). 
The longer a local leader is in office, the more likely for him to mobilize land 
finance to pursue development projects. Also, younger leaders with greater prospects 
9 
	  
of promotion before reaching retirement age may be more eager to use land finance 
for promoting local development than older leaders.  
Model, Hypotheses, Data, and Methodology 
Dependent Variable 
  The dependent variable in this analysis is the degree of local governments’ 
reliance on land finance in a province.4 It is measured as the ratio of total land 
conveyance fee to the total budgetary revenue of sub-provincial governments in a 
province. This reflects the facts that land conveyance fees are under the direct control 
of sub-provincial governments (i.e. cities, counties, and townships) and provincial 
governments are not involved in land conveyance activities. Thus, to measure the 
degree of reliance of local governments in a province upon land finance, the 
denominator of the ratio should be the total budgetary revenue of sub-provincial 
governments in a province, excluding the budgetary revenue of the provincial 
government itself.  
Explanatory Variables and Hypotheses 
Our explanatory variables comprise a number of fiscal, political, 
socioeconomic, demographic, and geographic factors. We explore the 
relationship between the following key variables and the dependent variable, and 
test a number of related hypotheses. 
(1) Transfer dependency. This refers to the extent to which a province’s 
budgetary expenditure is funded by transfers from the central government. 
The numerator of this variable is central transfers to a province, including 
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those for provincial, prefectural, county and township levels of government in 
that province, while the denominator refers to budgetary spending by all of the 
four tiers of government within a province in China. It measures the gap 
between the self-raised revenues of all tiers of government within a province 
and their expenditure assignments (Wu and Wang 2013). 
H1: Local governments tend to rely more on land finance if they are 
located in a province with a greater transfer dependency on the central 
government. 
(2) Revenue decentralization. This is measured as the share of 
sub-provincial budgetary revenue in total provincial and sub-provincial 
budgetary revenue. It is calculated by summing up prefectural, county 
and township budgetary revenue first, and then dividing it by total 
provincial and sub-provincial budgetary revenue in a given province. 
To some extent, revenue decentralization also measures sub-provincial 
governments’ budgetary fiscal capacity within a province.  
H2: Local governments tend to rely more on land finance if they are 
located in a province with lower revenue decentralization. 
(3) Expenditure decentralization. This is measured as the share of 
sub-provincial budgetary expenditure in total provincial and 
sub-provincial budgetary expenditure. It is calculated by summing up 
prefectural, county and township budgetary expenditure first, and then 
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dividing it by total provincial and sub-provincial budgetary expenditure 
in a given province (Wu and Wang 2013). Expenditure decentralization 
also measures sub-provincial governments’ expenditure responsibilities 
in a province.  
H3: Local governments tend to rely more on land finance if they shoulder 
more expenditure responsibilities in a province. 
(4) Party secretary’s tenure. This is calculated as a provincial party 
secretary’s accumulated time in office (in months) by the end of that 
year. 
H4: A provincial party secretary’s length of time in office is positively 
associated with local governments’ reliance on land finance. 
(5) Party secretary’s distance to retirement. This is measured by deducting 
a provincial party secretary’s age from 70. 
H5: A provincial party secretary’s distance to retirement age is 
positively associated with local governments’ reliance on land finance.  
Other explanatory variables in the study include: 
• GDP is the measure of economic development level (i.e. real GDP per 
capita), with 1990 being used as the base year. 
• Tertiary industry ratio is a measure of industrial structure, calculated as 
the ratio of the output of tertiary industry to GDP. 
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• Secondary industry ratio is another measure of industrial structure, 
calculated as the ratio of the output of secondary industry to GDP. 
• Cultivated land is the measure of land endowment, calculated as per 
capita cultivated land. 
• Population density is measured as the number of residential population 
(i.e. permanent residents) per km2 of land area in a given province. 
Data 
For this empirical analysis, we use a panel dataset from 30 provincial-level 
jurisdictions in China between 1999 and 2009 (Tibet is not included due to data 
unavailability). Though provincial governments do not directly get involved in land 
leasing activities to raise revenue, an analysis based on aggregated data at the 
provincial level sheds light on the effects of central-provincial fiscal relations, 
within-province fiscal arrangements, and regional political and socioeconomic factors 
etc. on land finance. For land conveyance fees, we use the data reported in China 
Land and Resource Almanac (zhongguo guotu ziyuan nianjian). Data used for other 
variables of our empirical analysis are taken from the Compendium of Fiscal Statistics 
for All Prefectures, Cities, and Counties (Quanguo dishixian caizheng tongji ziliao), 
the Finance Yearbook of China (zhongguo caizheng nianjian), China Data Online, 
and sources on the Internet. Table 1 sets out the definitions of the variables included 
in the regression models and their data sources. 
[Table 1 about here] 
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Methodology 
The following equation is used as the baseline model for our empirical analysis: Y!" = α+ βX!" + λ! + u!"                                                          (1) 
where Y is the dependent variable. X contains a set of explanatory variables, 
and λ    denotes individual-specific effects, with the subscripts i and t indicating each 
province and each year. u is the random error term. 
We run both fixed effects models and random effects models for the panel data 
analysis, and report the results of province-specific fixed effects models in Table 3.5 
The selection of fixed effects model over random effects model is based on the result 
from the Hausman test that indicates that a fixed effects model is preferred. However, 
in our model, there may be a two-way causal relationship between the variable 
measuring economic development (i.e. real GDP per capita) and our dependent 
variable-land finance. Thus, we resort to the instrumental variable approach by 
adopting two-stage least square estimation (2SLS). We test different instruments for 
the variable of real GDP per capita. The combination of the one-year lag of GDP and 
the two-year and three-year lags of per capita power of agricultural machinery6 is 
found to be the strongest group of instruments based on a weak instrument test (Stock 
and Yogo 2002). All variables in the models are log-transformed, and their coefficient 
estimates can be understood as elasticities.7 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics of the variables in our models are shown in Table 2. The 
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first two columns of Table 3 present empirical results obtained from a province-fixed 
effects model and a province-fixed effects 2SLS model, respectively. The last column 
shows the results from a 2SLS model with two-way (both province- and year-) fixed 
effects. We discuss the major findings from the two 2SLS models for our analysis 
since it controls for the potential endogeneity of the variable-real GDP per capita. 
[Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
Starting from the second column of Table 3, the coefficient on transfer 
dependency is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result 
confirms our hypothesis H1 that the greater the transfer dependency in a province, 
the more reliance of local governments in that province on land finance. After the 
1994 tax-sharing system reform, the central government recentralized much of 
the revenues, but left the expenditure responsibilities almost unchanged (Wong 
2000). Thus, sub-national governments came under increased fiscal pressure to 
meet the expenditure mandates required by the central government (e.g. 
infrastructure construction, basic education, and health care). Even though central 
transfers can relieve the fiscal pressure to some extent, local governments still 
have to turn to extra-budgetary funds, such as land conveyance fees, to make up 
for the revenue shortfall. 
The coefficient on revenue decentralization is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. It confirms our hypothesis H2 that a smaller share of a 
province’s budgetary revenue available to the sub-provincial governments is 
associated with greater reliance of sub-provincial governments on land finance. 
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Our hypothesis H3, however, is not confirmed; the coefficient on the variable of 
expenditure decentralization is not statistically significant at the 10% level.8 This 
suggests that revenue decentralization plays a more significant role than 
expenditure decentralization in sub-provincial governments’ decisions on land 
finance.  
Both hypotheses concerning the two political variables, H4 and H5, are 
supported by our empirical results. The provincial party secretary’s time in office 
and the distance to retirement age are both positively associated with the reliance 
on land finance and statistically significant at the 5% level. It suggests, first, the 
longer a party secretary stays in office in a jurisdiction, the more likely he is to 
raise revenue from land leasing; second, as a provincial party secretary 
approaches retirement age, he may have less incentive to promote economic 
development by drawing on land finance. 
Turning to the other control variables in the model, our findings suggest 
that: 1) prosperous provinces (with high GDP per capita) are more likely to draw 
on the land market to gain land conveyance fee, ceteris paribus; 2) with greater 
per capita cultivated land, a local government can expropriate more land to lease 
out for extra budgetary revenue; and 3) higher population density leads to a 
higher demand for urban infrastructure and other public services, which may 
encourage local governments to rely more on land finance. 
To test the robustness of our empirical results, we include two-way (both 
province- and year-) fixed effects in our 2SLS model. Most of the year dummies are 
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statistically significant, implying that the reliance of local fiscal system on land 
finance is strongly influenced by national economic conditions and central authorities’ 
policies over land and housing market. The two key independent variables in our 
research, i.e. transfer dependency and within-province revenue decentralization, are 
still statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively, with no change in 
the sign of the coefficients. Political variables, however, lose their statistical 
significance. This may be due to the fact that provincial party secretaries do not have 
a direct influence on local land finance decisions in lower level jurisdictions within 
the province. 
Conclusions and Implications 
Land finance has become a prominent revenue source for local governments in 
China in recent years. Using land finance to fund capital projects relieves the pressure 
on local governments to tap credit markets for financing, potentially reducing their 
overall risk profile (Peterson and Kaganova 2010). But it has also caused substantial 
public concerns because of many problems, including the instability and 
non-sustainability of land leasing revenue, encroachment on farmland, 
inter-generational inequity, the dangers of possible housing bubbles, corruption, 
inadequate consultation and compensation and associated community unrest. 
Untangling the determinants of land finance by using a provincial-level panel dataset 
from 1999 to 2009, this research finds that, fiscally, the large budgetary mismatch 
between revenue and expenditure for a province, and the weak budgetary fiscal 
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capacity of local governments contributes to the rise in dependence on land finance. 
Politically, a provincial party secretary’s time in office and the distance to retirement 
may also be positively associated with the reliance on land finance, though this 
suggestion requires further investigation. 
     The implications are mainly twofold. First, intellectually, this research makes a 
contribution to the public finance literature by untangling the determinants of land 
finance arrangements in China. It corroborates and provides further explanation of the 
findings in the existing literature, suggesting that reliance on extra-budgetary funds in 
developing countries is associated with various ‘market’ and budgetary failures, some 
arising from political economy factors (Allen and Radev 2006). 
Second, the research findings may have implications for policies addressing the 
problems of overreliance on land finance. We believe they lend support to 
much-needed fiscal reforms to address the mismatch in the revenue capacity and 
expenditure responsibilities amongst the central, provincial, and sub-provincial 
governments (Wong and Bird 2008). The heavy reliance on central transfers by 
subnational governments needs to be addressed. One option to reduce the reliance is 
to shrink the central government’s share of shared-taxes (e.g. value-added tax and 
corporate profit tax), while the other option is to let local governments have exclusive 
access to a more sustainable revenue source, such as property taxes. Our findings are 
also consistent with other research (Ye 2004; Wu and Wang 2013) that found that 
provincial governments, being between the center and sub-provincial governments, 
can easily grab funds intended for sub-national governments to meet their own 
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interests. As a result, sub-provincial administrations often bear the brunt of fiscal 
pressure, while provincial accounts are maintained at a healthy level (Yep 2004). 
More effective mechanisms are needed to constrain the capacity of provincial 
governments to grab revenues intended for more local governments, including greater 
transparency about fiscal transfers. Last but not least, the combination of a 
GDP-driven political emphasis and the top-down personnel management system 
might be contributing to local officials’ myopic behaviour over leasing land in order 
to enhance their own political prospects. For this reason, more effective monitoring 
and long-term planning over land development and the establishment of a more 
democratic system that holds public officials accountable to local citizens in China are 
needed. To limit excessive land leasing by local entrepreneurial officials, integrating 
land finance into the formal budgetary framework is a must-do for future budgetary 
reform in China.
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Table 1. Definition and Data Source of the Variables 
 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Reliance on land 
finance 
The ratio of land conveyance 
fee divided by total 
sub-provincial budgetary 
revenue 
China Land and Resource 
Almanac (1999-2009); 
China Data Online 
(1999-2009) 
Transfer 
dependency 
% of total budgetary spending 
in a province funded by 
intergovernmental transfer 
Finance Yearbook of 
China (1999-2009) 
Revenue 
decentralization 
Revenue share of 
sub-provincial governments 
in a province 
Compendium of Fiscal 
Statistics for All 
Prefectures, Cities, and 
Counties (1999-2009) 
Expenditure 
decentralization 
Expenditure share of 
sub-provincial governments 
in a province 
Same as above 
Party secretary’s 
tenure 
A provincial party secretary’s 
accumulated time in office (in 
months) by the end of that 
year 
Online sources9 
Party secretary’s 
distance to 
retirement 
70 minus a provincial party 
secretary’s age 
Same as above 
GDP Real GDP per capita  China Data Online 
(1996-2009) 
Tertiary industry 
ratio 
% of Tertiary Industry Output 
in GDP 
China Data Online 
(1999-2009) 
Secondary 
industry ratio 
% of Secondary Industry 
Output in GDP 
Same as above 
Cultivated land Per capita cultivated land Same as above 
Population 
density 
the number of residential 
population per km2 of land 
area  
Same as above 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (1999-2009) 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Reliance on land finance 43.94 39.06 0.39 318.92 
Transfer dependency 51.92 16.79 14.06 93.01 
Revenue decentralization 75.59 11.94 41.99 94.49 
Expenditure decentralization 71.06 10.44 46.25 89.23 
Party secretary’s tenure 32.02 23.86 2.00 132.00 
Party secretary’s distance to 
retirement 10.46 4.03 2.00 23.25 
GDP 7749.11 5572.79 1490.35 34895.55 
Tertiary industry ratio 38.92 6.4 28.63 75.53 
Secondary industry ratio 45.83 7.74 19.76 62.42 
Cultivated land 0.11 0.08 0.01 0.35 
Population density 386.62 484.57 7.08 3023.62 
Notes: The total number of observation is 330.  
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Table 3. Regression Results for Chinese Local Governments’ Reliance on 
Land Finance (1999-2009) 
 
 
Models 
Explanatory Variable Fixed Effects 
FE- 
2SLS 
TWFE- 
2SLS 
Transfer dependency 1.22*** 1.22*** 0.49** 
 
(3.79) (3.78) (1.97) 
Revenue decentralization -3.75*** -3.84*** -1.37*** 
 
(-4.96) (-5.01) (-2.68) 
Expenditure decentralization -0.63 -0.51 -1.16 
 
(-0.71) (-0.57) (-1.61) 
Party secretary’s tenure 0.13** 0.13*** 0.04 
 
(2.56) (2.60) (0.96) 
Party secretary’s distance to 
retirement 0.28** 0.28** 0.09 
 
(2.22) (2.24) (0.91) 
GDP 1.86*** 1.80*** 0.11 
 
(9.65) (9.00) (0.14) 
Tertiary industry ratio 0.48 0.51 0.27 
 
(0.83) (0.88) (0.56) 
Secondary industry ratio -0.13 -0.04 0.46 
 
(-0.22) (-0.07) (0.82) 
Cultivated land 2.55*** 2.49*** 0.38 
 
(3.35) (3.30) (0.57) 
Population density 5.10*** 5.13*** -1.83 
 
(3.30) (3.32) (-1.14) 
    Year-fixed effects No No Yes 
Number of observations 330 330 330 
R-squared 0.65 0.65 0.81 
Hansen J Test (P-value)   0.14 0.81 
Notes: All variables are expressed in natural logs. In the FE-2SLS and TWFE-2SLS models, 
the GDP variable is treated as endogenous. Statistical significance levels: *10%, **5%, 
***1%. t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors.  
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1 According to Wong and Bird (2008), EBFs, broadly defined, constitute “all 
resources managed directly or indirectly by administrative branches of the 
government outside the normal budgetary process” (p.443).   
2 Some works treat “land finance” as an umbrella concept, including land-related 
taxes, land leasing revenues and land-as-collateral borrowings. But to distinguish land 
finance from formal budgetary public finance, we limit the discussion of land finance 
to the most important category of local non-budgetary funds, i.e. land conveyance fee. 
Also, we distinguish land finance from land-as-collateral borrowings, which are local 
debt indeed. 
3 See http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2006-12/26/content_7557491.htm for the 
Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Regulating the Management of 
Revenues from and Expenses for the Assignment of the Right to Use State-owned 
Land issued by the Chinese central government in 2006. 
4 In this research, without special notation, local governments in China refer to 
sub-provincial governments, including cities, counties, and townships.	  
5 We also estimate a model with year-fixed effects included as a robustness check of 
our analysis. 
6 As an indicator of agricultural modernization, per capita power of agricultural 
machinery meets two requirements for an instrumental variable: First, it must be 
correlated with the endogenous independent variable (GDP); and second, it cannot be 
related with the error term in the explanatory equation. 
7	   We also use the Newey-West estimation procedure to deal with the problem of 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Newey and West 1997).	  
8 The Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r) between revenue decentralization and 
expenditure decentralization is 0.61, which does not appear to indicate a potential 
problem of multicollinearity in our regression analysis. The results are essentially the 
same when we run models with either one of the two variables included in the model. 
9 The data are collected from http://baike.baidu.com/ (a Chinese website) and 
http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia (an English website).   
